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The idea that wars can be ended with a single blow has hypnotised gen-
erals and military thinkers for centuries. However, it seems that the 
notion of “decisive battle” was firmly established only in the middle of 
the 19th century by the British author Edward S. Creasy. Creasy’s book 
The Fifteen Decisive Battles of the World inspired a tradition of histo-
riography seeking to define the most important battles in the history 
of mankind. Importantly, Creasy noted not only the short-term stra-
tegic, but also the long-term social and political consequences of the 
decisive battles of his choice. This essay analyses the original concepts 
of Creasy, and also the later changes and additions to the tradition, cre-
ated by Creasy, by the late 19th century and the 20th century Anglo-Saxon 
and German historians and writers. It argues that “decisive battle” is a 
concept of hindsight and a tool for historians, as the importance and 
the decisiveness of individual military engagements can only be gauged 
from a temporal distance. This has probably been never as true as in the 
ongoing “war on terror.”
Although there may have been forerunners for the term “decisive battle,”1 
the notion was firmly established by the British author Sir Edward S. 
Creasy in his book The Fifteen Decisive Battles of the World – From Mara-
1 The use of the word “decisive” by Creasy and in this essay is distinct from the modern use 
of that term by the U.S. Army: “Decisive Victory: […] Whenever the Army is called upon, it 
fights to win and operates to achieve decisive results at minimum cost to life and treasure.” FM 
100-7. Decisive Force: The army in theatre operations (Headquarters, Department of the Army: 
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thon to Waterloo, which was published in 1851. It was a best-seller for 
decades to come. The fundamental problem of Creasy and many of his 
more or less prominent successors was to define and identify the “deci-
sive” character of military engagements. The most important and inno-
vative factor for the term “decisive battles” as defined by Creasy was the 
universal or global approach. His battles were certainly limited to the 
cultures inhabiting Europe, the Mediterranean and North America dur-
ing the last 2,341 years, thereby ignoring for example any Chinese, Japa-
nese or pre-Columbian American cultures, but nevertheless the choice of 
Creasy was much more universal and global than any approach before. 
This liberated the notion “decisive battles” from the nationalistic restric-
tions of the time and made it a tool for comparison in military history.
The Anglo-Saxon tradition of decisive battles started with Creasy and 
he dominated the scene up to the inter-war period. But the First World 
War as a global event with far reaching consequences (especially the col-
lapse of the Russian, German, Austria-Hungarian and Ottoman Empires) 
necessitated a reformulation of Creasy, which was started by John Freder-
ick Charles Fuller with his The Decisive Battles of the Western World and 
their influence upon history. Fuller began writing the book in the inter-
war period, but finished it only after the Second World War.2 As Fuller 
tried to become the Creasy of the 20th century, Joseph B. Mitchell was less 
ambiguous and simply updated Creasy by adding five post-1851 battles 
to the original fifteen chosen by Creasy.3 For some time new develop-
ments in military historiography seemed to make the approach of Creasy 
too old-fashioned for modern historians. But his approach prevailed, as 
many book titles (not only for the popular book market) would prove.
This paper discusses the development of the notion “decisive battle” 
in the context of the history of military historiography under the guiding 
questions: Are there lessons to be learned from decisive battles, or is the 
Washington, DC, 1995), 1 of 13. The hint on this important difference in usage was given to the 
author by the late Lt. Col. Ted Westhusing.
2 J. F. C. Fuller, The Decisive Battles of the Western World and their influence upon history. 
3 volumes (London: Eyre & Spottiswoode, 1954–1956).
3 J.B. Mitchell and E.S. Creasy, Zwanzig entscheidende Schlachten der Weltgeschichte 
(Gütersloh: Bertelsmann, 1968).
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debate about the notion of “decisive battles” already the most important 
learning effect? If and how could the notion of “decisive battles,” which 
was dear to strategists of the long 19th century (until 1914), could still play 
a role as a theoretical model in post-9/11 warfare.
Birth of the notion “decisive battle”
Description and depictions of famous battles as curiosities are known 
since Antiquity. In the Age of Nationalism they became part of the 
national narrative of history, which was created to establish an identity 
of the nation-state. Probably the most famous of such early 19th century 
approaches of telling national history by a story of important battles was 
the galerie des batailles [battle gallery] in the Versailles castle, which since 
the 1830s depicted French history from the battle of Tolbiac to the much 
more recent Napoleonic Wars.4 Other examples for accumulations of 
battle scenes decisive for a national history are in the British memorial 
rooms in the galleries of the Sandhurst Companies5 for the army, and in 
the Gunroom of the Britannia Naval College at Dartmouth for the navy.6 
Decisiveness of battles in such pictorial narratives was rather limited, as 
only victorious events for the individual nation qualified for entry in the 
respective memorial room. There were definitely forerunners for the term 
“decisive battle,” the concept was established by Sir Edward S. Creasy in 
4 C. Constans, Versailles. La Galerie des batailles (Paris: Khayat, 1984): Tolbiac, Poitiers, Pad-
erborn, Paris, Bouvines, Taillebourg, Mons-en-Puelle, Cassel, Cocherel, Orleans, Castillon, 
Naples, Marignan, Calais, Paris, Rocroy, Lens, Dunes, Valenciennes, Marsaille, Villaviciosa, 
Denain, Fontenoy, Lawfeld, York-Town, Fleurus, Rivoli, Aboukir, Zurich, Hohenlinden, Aus-
terlitz, Iena, Friedland, Wagram. The spelling and the order of the battle names always follow 
the respective book.
5 Blenheim, Dettingen, Salamanca, Waterloo, Inkerman, Marne, Somme, Ypres, Gaza, Ami-
ens, Alamein, Salerno, Normandy, Arnhem, River Rhine, Burma. D. G. Chandler (ed.), Great 
Battles of the British Army as commemorated in the Sandhurst Companies (London: Arms and 
Armour, 1991).
6 The Danes, Sluys, Armada, Santa Cruz, St. James's Day Fight, La Hogue, Passaro, Cape 
Finisterre, Quiberon Bay, Les Saintes, Glorious 1st June, St. Vincent, Aboukir, Copenhagen, 
Trafalgar, San Domingo, Basque Roads, Acre, Falkland Islands, Jutland, River Plate, Taranto, 
Matapan, North Cape, Falklands. E. Grove (ed.), Great Battles of the Royal Navy as commemo-
rated in the Gunroom, Britannia Naval College, Dartmouth (London: Bramley, 1994).
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his book The Fifteen Decisive Battles of the Word – From Marathon to 
Waterloo, published in 1851. It would be a most popular book for many 
years to come. Creasy chose his subject for the following reason:
The Universal Peace Society certainly does not, and probably never will, 
enrol the majority of statesmen among its members. [...] For a writer, 
therefore, of the present day to choose battles for his favourite topic, 
merely because they were battles; merely because so many myriads of 
troops were arrayed in them, and so many hundreds of thousands of 
human beings stabbed, hewed, or shot each other to death during them, 
would argue strange weakness or depravity of mind.
Creasy went on to explain that not the number of casualties makes a bat-
tle decisive, because
[i]t is not because only a few hundreds fell in the battle by which Joan of 
Arc captured the Tourelles and raised the siege of Orleans, that the effect 
of that crisis is to be judged: [...] There are some battles, also, which claim 
our attention independently of the moral worth of the combatants, on 
account of their enduring importance, and by reason of the practical 
influence on our own social and political condition, which we can trace 
up to the results of those engagements. They have for us an abiding and 
actual interest, both while we investigate the chain of causes and effects, 
by which they have helped to make us what we are; and also while we 
speculate on what we probably should have been, if any of those battles 
had come to a different termination.7
The most significant element in Creasy’s notion of “decisive battles” was 
its globalism. His selection of battles was limited to Europe, the Medi-
terranean and North America in the last 2,341 years; and thus Chinese, 
Japanese, pre-Columbian American and other cultures were ignored. 
Nevertheless, Creasy’s approach was more universal than any approach 
before him. This liberated the notion “decisive battles” from the nation-
alistic restrictions of the time and made it a tool for comparison in mili-
7 E.S. Creasy, The Fifteen Decisive Battles of the World. From Marathon to Waterloo (London: 
Nelson, s.a. [first edition: 1851]), 3–5.
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tary history. The definition of decisive battles by Creasy was at least half-
Clausewitzian as he embraced not only purely military aspects but also 
the “practical influence of the social and political condition” as a criterion 
for decisiveness.
“Decisive battles” between Anglo-Saxon  
and German interpretations
Although it had many forerunners, the concept of decisive battles as 
used – one might even say discovered – by Creasy had a decisive impact 
on the military historiographies from the second part of the 19th century 
at least up to the creation of a military history more inclined to social fac-
tors than to battles, i.e. up to the mid-20th century. For the matter of the 
argument of this essay, the discussion of the tradition or school created by 
Creasy will be limited to the Anglo-Saxon and to the German followers of 
Creasy only, as they show the possibilities and deficiencies of his concept 
in the most comprehensive way.
The Anglo-Saxon tradition of decisive battles started with Creasy and 
he dominated the scene up to the inter-war period. (The listing of the 
traditions does not seek to be complete, it takes the most obvious and 
in many cases most influential examples for an approach in the tradi-
tion of Creasy in different ages (especially for the pre-WW I, interwar, 
post-WW II periods). The First World War was a global event with far 
reaching consequences, including the collapse of the Russian, German, 
Austria-Hungarian and Ottoman Empires. It necessitated a reformula-
tion of Creasy, which was started by John Frederick Charles Fuller in his 
The Decisive Battles of the Western World and their influence upon history 
(finished after the Second World War).8 Whereas Fuller’s approach was an 
ambitious one, Joseph B. Mitchell simply updated Creasy by adding five 
post-1851 battles to the fifteen chosen by Creasy.9
One could argue that new developments in military historiography 
made the approach of Creasy too old-fashioned for modern historians. 
8 Fuller, The Decisive Battles of the Western World.
9 Mitchell and Creasy, Zwanzig entscheidende Schlachten.
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As an example for a modern anti-Creasy approach the book War in Euro-
pean History by Michael Howard could be mentioned. Howard took the 
social status of the soldier as the structure of his military history, whereby 
the battles to a certain extent were degraded to be just a reflection of the 
social position of the soldier at any given period (Wars of the Knights, 
Mercenaries, Merchants, Professionals, Revolution, Nations, Technolo-
gists, Nuclear Age).10 Nevertheless the concept of decisive battle accu-
mulations still has an appeal on the popular book-market.11 There are 
other approaches within the broader Creasy tradition, which are less apt 
for direct comparison as they do not use the chronological approach, 
but for example an A-Z encyclopaedical order,12 which was made popu-
lar by Harbottle half a century after Creasy.13 As the Chandler dictionary 
10 M. Howard, War in European History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1976).
11 P. K. Davis, 100 Decisive Battles from Ancient Times to the Present (Santa Barbara: ABC-
CLIO, 1999) and F. Regan, Battles That Changed History. Fifty decisive battles spanning over 
2500 years of warfare (London: Deutsch, 2002).
12  D.G. Chandler (ed.), Dictionary of Battles. The world’s key battles from 405 BC to today 
(New York: Henry Holt, 1988): Actium, Aegospotami, Aquae Sextiae-Vercellae, Chaeronae, 
Cunaxa, Gaugamela-Arbela, Leuctra, Victories of Marcus, Metaurus, Milvian Bridge, Palmyra, 
Pyrrhic Victories, Pharsalus, Rome, Salamis, Victories of Trajan, Ashdown - Saucourt - Paris - 
Dyle, Catterick, Civitate, Hastings, Lech, Maldon, Mauriac Plain, Roncesvalles - Suntel Moun-
tains, Taginae - Casilinum, Yarmuk, Acre, Agincourt, Antioch, Arsuf, Ascalon, Ayn Jalut, Bos-
worth, Bouvines, Constantinople, Crecy, Dorylaeum, Kutna Hora, Liegnitz, Morat, Nicopolis, 
Poitiers, Sluys, Tinchebrai, Belgrade, Breitenfeld, Fontenoy, Lepanto, Leuthen, Lille, Malta, 
Naseby, Pavia, Poltava, Quebec, Ramillies, Rocroi, Armada, Acre, Assaye, Austerlitz, Boro-
dino, Brandywine, Busaco, Gibraltar, Jena-Auerstaedt, Lake Champlain, Saints, Salamanca, 
Trafalgar, Valmy, Waterloo, Yorktown, Antietam-Sharpsburg, Balaclava, Buena Vista, Chancel-
lorsville, Colenso, Delhi, Gettysburg, Hampton Roads, Manila Bay, Omdurman, Port Arthur, 
Sedan, Tsushima, Vicksberg, Amiens, Cambrai, Caporetto, Gallipoli, Jutland, Kut Al-Amara, 
Marne, Megiddo, Somme, Tannenberg, Verdun, Ypres, Madrid, Mannerheim Line, El Alam-
ein, Ardennes, Arnhem, Atlantic, Berlin, Britain, Corregidor, Crete, D-Day - Seine, Dieppe, 
France, Gazala-Bir Hacheim, Guadalcanal, Gustav Line, Imphal-Kohima, Kursk, Leningrad, 
Leyte Gulf, Malta, Midway, Moscow, Okinawa, Pearl Harbour, Ploesti-Peenemunde, Sevasto-
pol, Singapore, Stalingrad, Algiers, Cedar Falls-Junction City, Chinese Farm, Dien Bien Phu, 
Entebbe, Golan Heights, Goose Green, Hsuchow, Imjin, Inchon, Indonesian-British Confron-
tation, Jerusalem, Khe Sanh, Khorramshahr, Malaya, Mirbat, East Pakistan, Panjsher Valley, 
Peace for Galilee, Port Stanley, Pusan, Red River Delta, Rolling Thunder-Linebacker, Saigon, 
Sinai, Suez 1956, Suez 1973, Tet Offensive. See also D. Eggenberger, An Encyclopaedia of Battles: 
Accounts of over 1560 battles from 1479 B.C. to the present (Mineola, NY: Dover, 1985).
13 T.B. Harbottle and G. Bruce, Harbottle’s Dictionary of Battles (London: Granada, 1979). 
Harbottle and Bruce listed well over 1,000 battles.
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the book Strategy by Liddell Hart was a milestone in modern “indirect” 
Creasy reception,14 although it did not stick to the battle approach, but 
used a discussion by periods instead and did therefore not qualify for the 
“direct” Creasy tradition.
As the Creasy approach is still very much alive in the Anglo-Saxon 
world, the choice presented here is necessarily limited.15 Outside the 
scientific or popular Creasy reception his concept is used for children’s 
books introducing military history.16 The comparison of the battles cho-
sen by Creasy (updated in a post-World War II edition by Mitchell) with 
battles chosen by other authors adopting the Creasy method may help to 
discover both the nucleus and the analytical possibilities of the Creasy 
approach (Table 1).
First of all – and there is no surprise – the Anglo-Saxon tradition is 
very Anglo-Saxon-centred in its choice of post-Antiquity decisive battles. 
The choice of decisive battles by Creasy with the slight exception of Mara-
thon prevailed within the choice of his followers, whereas the additions 
of Mitchell especially for the period “1776/1789 to the eve of WW1” did 
not make it to become part of the tradition. In general it seems that the 
agreement on what is to be considered as a decisive battle is much easier 
as more distant the authors are from the relevant period, i.e. there seems 
to be a consensus on the decisive battles of Antiquity and of the Middle 
Ages, whereas there has not yet emerged a canon of decisive battles for 
the 20th century. The decisive battle canon of Antiquity in the beginning 
of the Anglo-Saxon tradition tended to comprise slightly more Greek 
than Roman battles, but later added other events from Roman history. 
It may be an over-interpretation, but Creasy listing three Greek and only 
14 B.H. Liddell Hart, Strategy. The indirect approach (London: Faber and Faber, 1967).
15 Other editions and re-editions of books in this tradition comprise M. L. Lanning and 
B. Rosenburgh, The Battle 100. The Stories behind history’s most influential battles (London: 
Sourcebooks, 2003); F. Pratt and E. Gorey, The Battles that Changed History (Mineola, NY: 
Dover, 2000); and W. Weir, 50 Battles that Changed the World: The conflicts that most influenced 
the course of history (New York: New Page Books, 2001). C. Falls (ed.), Great Military Battles 
(New York: Macmillan, 1964) was an important book in the Creasy tradition, but was limited 
to battles from 1643 to 1944. 
16 Megiddo, Thermopylae, Cannae, Tours, Hastings, Acre, Agincourt, Lepanto, Luetzen, 
Plassey, Trafalgar, Waterloo, Gettysburg, Sedan, Little Big Horn, Cambrai, Britain, Midway, 
Kursk – F. Wilkinson, Famous Battles (London: Macdonald Educational, 1979).
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two Roman battles may still be in the mood of Philhellenism of the early 
19th century, whereas later generations may be inclined to emphasise the 
more direct influence of Roman battles to the creation of modern Europe.
But how did the Creasy approach transform, when it was applied to 
another country? The German tradition started with a clear reference 
to Creasy, as the “idea of the editor was to edit Creasy [...] for the Ger-
man reader,” but Christian Friedrich Maurer, author of Entscheidungss-
chlachten der Weltgeschichte [Decisive Battles of Word History], declared 
“to be as independent as possible from the views of the English historian.”17 
Much quicker than in the Anglo-Saxon tradition came an update for the 
changed perspective during the First World War, when Walter Heichen 
published his Die Entscheidungsschlachten der Weltgeschichte von Mara-
thon bis Tsuschima. [Decisive Battles of World History from Marathon to 
Tsushima. A book about the struggle of the peoples for the position of power 
in former and modern times].18
Another try for such an approach was made on the eve of the Sec-
ond World War in Nazi Germany, when Friedrich von Cochenhausen 
edited Schicksalsschlachten der Völker [Battles of Destiny of the Peoples].19 
Cochenhausen and his fellow authors were a mix of retired soldiers very 
much in the tradition of the pre-1914 German military history writing 
and of representatives of new Nazi “scholars” seeing military historiogra-
phy as a tool to foster the aims of Nazi ideology. During the Nazi period 
the Creasy approach was even adjusted to the racial concepts of Nazism 
and thereby limited to decisive battles of the Germanic tribes.20 German 
17 C. F. Maurer, Entscheidungsschlachten der Weltgeschichte (Leipzig: Weber, 1890) [“Der 
Gedanke des Herrn Verleger war es, E. Creasys Fünfzehn Entscheidungsschlachten für deutsche 
Leser herauszugeben. Ich glaubte, diese Arbeit übernehmen zu können, – allerdings unter der 
Voraussetzung, mich möglichst unabhängig von den Anschauungen des englischen Historikers 
bewegen zu dürfen.”].
18 W. Heichen, Die Entscheidungsschlachten der Weltgeschichte von Marathon bis Tsuschima. 
Ein Buch vom Ringen der Völker um die Machtstellung in alter und neuer Zeit (Altenburg: 
Geibel, 1915).
19 F.v. Cochenhausen (ed.), Schicksalsschlachten der Völker (Berlin: Deutscher Verlag fuer Poli-
tik und Wirtschaft, 1937).
20 K. Pastenaci, Entscheidungsschlachten der Germanen (Berlin: Nordland, 1944): Gallien, Teu-
toburger Wald, Strassburg, Adrianopel, Katalaunische Felder.
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Table 1:
Decisive Battles – British/Anglo-Saxon tradition
Creasy / Mitchell 
(1851/1964)
Fuller 
(1939–40/1954–56)
Regan 
(1992)
Davis 
(1999)
Antiquity Marathon
Syracuse
Arbela
Metaurus
Arminius/Varus
Salamis
Syracuse – Aegospotami
Gaugamela/Arbela
Metaurus/Zama
Pydna
Dyrrhachium/Pharsalus
Philippi/Actium
Teutoburger Wald
Adrianople
Salamis
Syracuse
Guagamela [sic!]
Beneventum
Zama
Actium
Teutoburger Wald
Adrianople
Megiddo
Thymbra
Marathon
Salamis
Syracuse
Leuctra
Chaeronea
Gaugamela/
Arbela
Ipsus
Metaurus
Kai-hsia
Zama
Pydna
Alesia
Pharsalus
Actium
Teutoburger Wald
Beth-Horon
Milvian Bridge
Adrianople
After Antiquity  
and before 
1776/1789
Chalons
Tours
Hastings
Orleans
Armada
Blenheim
Pultowa 
[Poltava]
Chalons/Mauriac Plain
Tricameron/Taginae
Constantinople/Tours
Hastings
Manzikert
Hattin
Sluys/Crecy
Orleans
Constantinople
Malaga/Granada
Lepanto
Armada
Breitenfeld/Luetzen
Naseby
Blenheim
Poltava
Rossbach/Leuthen
Plassey
Plains of Abraham
Taginae
Yarmuk
Constantinople
Lechfeld
Hastings
Manzikert
Hattin
Las Navas de 
Tolosa
Ain Jalut
Crecy
Tannenburg
Orleans
Constantinople
Bosworth 
Field
Tenochtitlan
Vienna
Lepanto
Armada
Breitenfeld
Rocroi
Marston Moor
Blenheim
Poltava
Plassey
Quebec
Chalons
Tricameron
Badr
Constantinople
Tours/Poitiers
Pavia
Lechfeld
Hastings
Manzikert
Jerusalem
Hattin
Taraori
Bouvines
Ain Jalut
Hsiang-yang
Hakata Bay
Brusa
Crecy
Orleans
Constantinople
Granada
Tenochtitlan
Panipat 
Vienna 
Cajamarca
Lepanto
Armada
Sekigahara
Breitenfeld
Shanhai-kuan
Naseby
Dunes
Blenheim
Poltava
Culloden
Plassey
Quebec
1776/1789 to the 
eve of WW1
Saratoga
Valmy
Waterloo
Vicksburg
Koeniggraetz
Saratoga
Chesapeake/Yorktown
Valmy
Trafalgar
Jena/Auerstaedt
Leipzig
Waterloo
Seven Days Battle
Vicksburg/Chattanooga
Sedan
Port Arthur
Saratoga
Trafalgar
Austerlitz
Waterloo
Gettysburg
Koeniggraetz
Sedan
Tsushima
Trenton
Saratoga
Yorktown
Valmy
Rivoli
Aboukir Bay/Nile
Trafalgar
Jena/Auerstaedt
Prophetstown/ 
Tippecanoe
Borodino
Leipzig
Waterloo
Ayacucho
San Jacinto
Mexico City
Antietam/Sharpsburg
Gettysburg
Atlanta/March to the 
Sea
Sedan
Tel el Kebir
Manila Bay
Mukden
Tsushima
WW1 and WW2 Marne
Midway
Stalingrad
Marne/Tannenberg
Sari Bair/ Suvla Bay
Amiens
Vittorio-Veneto
Warsaw
Sedan
Moscow
Midway
El Alamein/Tunis
Stalingrad
Normandy
Leyte Gulf
Marne
Sedan
Britain
Midway
El Alamein
Stalingrad
Marne
Verdun
Brusilov Offensive
Marne
Warsaw
Poland [sic!]
Dunkirk
Britain
Moscow
Pearl Harbour
Singapore
Midway
Normandy
Okinawa
After WW2 – – Dien Bien Phu
Six Day War
Second Gulf War
Israel’s War of Independence
Huai Hai/Suchow
Inchon
Dien Bien Phu
Tet Offensive
Desert Storm
The names of battles, campaigns, and sieges are given in the spelling used by the different authors.  
The distinction in five major periods is added for the purpose of the argument of this essay.
BOLD print: mentioned by 2 authors; UNDERLINED: mentioned by at least 3 authors
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military historiography obviously needed a long time to recover from 
these distortions and it is not by chance that many of the (West) German 
books on this subject between 1949 and 1990 were mere translations from 
the Anglo-Saxon tradition.21 This was even true for children’s books.22 An 
exception to this rule were the East German historians Walter Markov 
and Heinz Helmert with Schlachten der Weltgeschichte [Battles of Word 
History], which was published in both German states, but Markov and 
Helmert did not embrace the decisiveness aspect as much as Creasy had.23
In 2001 established German academia came out with the book 
Schlachten der Weltgeschichte [Battles of World History]. The preface set 
this publication clearly in the Creasy tradition, but tended to excuse 
the approach and to explain why the publication could nevertheless be 
positioned within the current mainstream of German historiography.24 
Directly in the Creasy tradition, but on the fringe of academic German 
military historiography, was Klaus-Jürgen Bremm with Im Schatten des 
21 F. Pratt, Schlachten, die Geschichte machten. Von Issus bis zu den Midways (Duesseldorf: 
Econ, 1965), and Mitchell and Creasy, Zwanzig entscheidende Schlachten.
22 V. Melegari, Die grossen Schlachten (Hamburg: Tessloff, 1982) as a translation from the Ita-
lian: Kadesch, Marathon, Salamis, Gaugamela, Cannae, Alesia, Katalaunische Felder, Poitiers, 
Hastings, Legnano, Kyuschu, Crecy, Azincourt, Orleans, Konstantinopel, Fornovo, Ravenna, 
Marignano, Pavia – Tunis, Lepanto, Luetzen, Rocroi, Maastricht, Wien, Fleurus, Belgrad, 
Fontenoy, Culloden Moor, Rossbach, Saratoga, Marengo, Trafalgar, Austerlitz, Waterloo, 
Balaklawa, San Martino-Solferino, Calatafimi – Volturno, Gettysburg, Koeniggraetz, Little Big 
Horn, Khartum, Tsushima, Tannenberg, Marne, Skagerrak, Verdun, Vittorio Veneto, El Ala-
mein, Midway, Stalingrad, Dien Bien Phu.
23 W. Markov and H. Helmert, Schlachten der Weltgeschichte (Gütersloh: Prisma, 1983): 
Kadesch, Marathon, Salamis, Lechaion, Leuktra, Gaugamela, Tschang-ping, Cannae, Pydna, 
Pharsalos, Teutoburger Wald, Jerusalem, Abrittus, Argentoratum, Katalaunische Felder, 
Ninive, Poitiers, Lechfeld, Hastings, Legnano, Kalka, Hakata, Takashima, Sempach, Grunwald-
Tannenberg, Usti nad Labem (Aussig), Murten, Pavia, Sekigahara, Luetzen, Wien-Kahlenberg, 
Hoechstaedt-Blenheim, Poltawa, Leuthen, Saratoga, Valmy, Bei den Pyramiden, Trafalgar, 
Austerlitz, Leipzig, Waterloo, Ayacucho, Solferino, Gettysburg, Koeniggraetz, Gravelotte-St. 
Privat, Adua, Mukden, Marneschlacht, Verdun, Skagerrak, Cambrai, Zarizyn, Guadalajara, 
Luftschlacht England, El Alamein, Stalingrad, Kursk, Normandie, Leyte, Berlin, Hiroshima.
24 S. Foerster, M. Poehlmann and D. Walter, Schlachten der Weltgeschichte. Von Salamis bis 
Sinai (Munich: Beck, 2001), 7–18: Salamis, Gaugamela, Cannae, Hastings, Hattin, Ayn Dscha-
lut, Murten, Panipat, Luetzen, Wien, Leuthen, Waterloo, Cold Harbor, Koeniggraetz, Sedan, 
Adua, Tsushima, Tannenberg, Verdun, Luftschlacht um England, Stalingrad, Okinawa, Dien 
Bien Phu, Sinai.
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Desasters. Zwölf Entscheidungsschlachten in der Geschichte Europas [In 
the Shadow of Disaster. Twelve Decisive Battles in the History of Europe].25 
A more modern and academically accepted version was Schlachtenmy-
then [Myths of Battles] by Gerd Krumeich and Susanne Brandt, whereby 
the focus shifted from the decisiveness of the battle to the persistence of 
the myth of the battle.26
The German authors can be compared in the following table (Table 2).
As the table shows, most striking is the choice of decisive battles in 
Antiquity. Before the Second World War, German authors agreed on 
Gaugamela and the Teutoburger Wald, whereby the victory of Arminius 
over Varus was at least as much decisive as a 19th century myth for the 
German nation-state as it was decisive in military terms. Quite remark-
ably the battle of Cannae practically did not play any role in pre-1945 
publications, although it dominated German military thinking from the 
1890s to the beginning of the First World War.27 A trend concerning the 
choice of decisive battles is obvious: as more recent the period was, the 
more linked to German history the choice of battles became. The big 
exception to this rule is Trafalgar, but even this choice of a more recent 
battle is better explained by German history than by the battle itself. As 
the navy became an important tool of the politics of Wilhelm II and of 
national German self-esteem, naval battles had to be represented in such 
a canon of decisive battles. This is especially true for Heichen and von 
Cochenhausen.
Beyond the discussion of the canon of the German tradition, it is 
important to explain the big gap of nearly fifty years between pre-1945 
and recent post-1990 publications. German military historiography 
was so much discredited after the Second World War, that there was in 
fact a massive break in such publications for nearly the whole Cold War 
25 K.-J. Bremm, Im Schatten des Desasters. Zwölf Entscheidungsschlachten in der Geschichte 
Europas (Osnabrück: BoD, 2003).
26 G. Krumeich and S. Brandt (ed.), Schlachtenmythen. Ereignis – Erzählung – Erinnerung 
(Cologne: Böhlau, 2003).
27 A. v. Schlieffen, Gesammelte Schriften. 2 volumes (Berlin: Mittler, 1913), J. L. Wallach, Das 
Dogma der Vernichtungsschlacht (Munich: dtv, 1980) and M. Healy, Cannae 216 BC. Hannibal 
smashes Rome’s army (Botley: Osprey, 1994).
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period. After the voluntary abuse of military historiography by Jingoism 
and Nazism and the destruction caused by the two world wars started 
by Germany, even serious military historiography had a hard time in the 
public view. That does not mean that there was no serious military his-
tory research during that time, but it could not appeal to the scientific 
and wider public in the same way as this was the case for military his-
tory writers in Britain, the USA or France. Therefore it is not by chance 
that German children’s books on these topics were translations from the 
Italian,28 that popular military history books were published as “Books on 
Demand” instead of a regular book by an established publishing house29 
and that the established academia tended to write on battle myths instead 
of decisive battles.30
Another story was the communist (East) German Democratic Repub-
lic (1949–1990), where military subjects were from a Marxist perspective 
much more a topic than in West Germany.31 Military history books were 
seen as a tool to foster the defensive spirit of the East German population 
against the capitalist enemy in the West. However, Markov and Helmert 
proved that scientifically sound books could be written despite this politi-
cal context. To conclude the analysis of these two traditions of the Creasy 
approach, it might be useful to contrast the Anglo-Saxon with the Ger-
man decisive battles canon in the following table (Table 3).
Perhaps surprisingly, the intersection of the Anglo-Saxon with the 
German tradition comes out as a perfect match for a possible European 
canon on decisive battles up to the eve of the First World War: Gaugamela, 
Teutoburger Wald, Armada, Blenheim/Hoechstaedt, Poltava, Trafalgar, 
Waterloo/Belle-Alliance and Sedan. It certainly neglects anything outside 
Europe (ignoring even the American War of Independence due to the 
German canon), but for a pure European perspective the common nomi-
nators are excellent. Both the Greek and the Roman heritage is remem-
bered by a battle, the Middle Ages are somehow neglected, but the choice 
for early modern Europe up to the second half of the 19th century well 
28 Melegari, Die grossen Schlachten.
29 Bremm, Im Schatten des Desasters. 
30 Krumeich and Brandt, Schlachtenmythen. 
31 Markov and Helmert, Schlachten der Weltgeschichte.
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Tabel 3:
Comparison between the British/Anglo-Saxon tradition and the German tradition
Creasy 
(without Mitchell)
British/Anglo-Saxon tradition 
(Fuller, Mitchell, Regan and 
Davis)
German tradition 
(Maurer, Heichen, von 
Cochenhausen, Bremm 
and Krumeich/Brandt)
Antiquity Marathon
Syracuse
Arbela
Metaurus
Arminius/Varus
Salamis
Syracuse
Gaugamela
Metaurus/Zama
Actium
Teutoburger Wald
Adrianople
Gaugamela
Teutoburger Wald
After 
Antiquity 
and before 
1776/1789
Chalons
Tours
Hastings
Orleans
Armada
Blenheim
Pultowa [Poltava]
Chalons
Constantinople/Tours
Hastings
Manzikert
Hattin
Crecy
Orleans
Constantinople
Lepanto
Armada
Breitenfeld
Blenheim
Poltava
Plassey
Quebec
Poitiers
Lechfeld
Armada
Wien
Hoechstaedt
Poltawa
1776/1789  
to the eve  
of WW1
Saratoga
Valmy
Waterloo
–
Saratoga
Valmy
Trafalgar
Waterloo
Sedan
Trafalgar
Belle-Alliance = 
Waterloo
Koeniggraetz
Sedan
WW1 and 
WW2
– Marne
Midway
Stalingrad
–
After WW2 – – –
Only battles mentioned in at least three works of the relevant tradition are listed.
BOLD print and UNDERLINED: part of both traditions. CROSSED OUT: not included in any tradition.
75Learning from Decisive Battles Prerequisites to Define and Identify Them
represents the European continent and its encounters in the Northeast, 
West, South and Centre (the Southeast with its Turkish invasions drops 
out because of the British tradition).
It is another story for the history of the post-1914 world, as the lack of 
any “measurable” canon by German tradition in the following of Creasy 
does not allow for the extracting of any intersections of either traditions. 
How good Creasy was in his choice of battles is highlighted by the fact 
that fourteen of his fifteen battles made it to persist at least in one of the 
two traditions (with the sole exception of Marathon, which did not make 
it for any tradition). The update by Mitchell was less successful for the 
period between Waterloo and the First World War, as neither Vicksburg 
nor Koeniggrätz really became generally accepted to be part of the canon. 
Instead of the choice by Mitchell, both traditions elaborated Sedan to be 
the most decisive battle for this period. Mitchell was much better for the 
two world wars as Marne, Midway and Stalingrad became firmly estab-
lished within the canon of the Anglo-Saxon tradition.
Battle of Poltava as depicted by the French painter Pierre-Denis Martin. 
Poltava did not feature in Creasy’s book, but was included in most of the later 
European historians in the Creasy tradition
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There is only one battle, which was ignored by Creasy when he wrote 
his book in 1851, but made it into the common canon of the Anglo-
Saxon and the German traditions: Trafalgar. As a pure naval engagement 
it certainly was not part of the focus of Creasy for his initial choice, but 
probably there are other reasons. Although Nelson was a hero in Britain 
ever since 1805 (and maybe even some years earlier), it probably took the 
patriotic impact of the celebration of the centenary of the battle and of his 
death in 1905 to firmly establish him within the British tradition. Amaz-
ingly, Nelson entered the German tradition in 1915 with Walter Heichen, 
which was clearly an effect of the enormous importance attributed by the 
German Emperor Wilhelm II and his contemporaries to the navy.
To finally conclude the analysis of the Creasy inspired traditions, a 
few derivatives have to be mentioned: there were and are still children’s 
books adapting the Creasy decisive-battle-approach to introduce a young 
readership to military history. Thereby the Creasy approach is probably 
not taken for methodological reasons, but as a form of Guinness Book of 
World Records for battles, whereby decisiveness equals the record and 
thereby justifies the entry. Other approaches in this more or less enter-
taining fashion are books about Last Stand! Famous Battles against the 
Odds32 or on Military Blunders.33 On one occasion the concept of decisive 
battles was, in a book on so-called Essential Militaria, transformed into a 
page long list of “One-Sided Victories.”34
Was there ever such a thing as a “decisive battle”?
The most basic form of a decisive battle is a fight one-man-against-one-
man, a chieftain fighting another chieftain in a duel, thereby symbolis-
ing their tribes. By the defeat and/or the death of one of those chieftains 
the fate of his whole tribe is decided – from subjugation to annihilation. 
“Democratisation” of warfare following the American and French Rev-
olutions obliterated this concept forever. There was no way to transfer 
32 B. Perrett, Last Stand! Famous battles against the odds (London: Cassell, 1991).
33 S. David, Military Blunders (London: Constable & Robinson, 1997).
34 N. Hobbes, Essential Militaria (London: Atlantic, 2003).
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this concept into a post-Absolutism-society, as the end of the doctrine 
of divine right meant the theoretical end of the validity of such represen-
tative duels, albeit in practice such personalised fights may never have 
played a major role.
It has to be mentioned that the ancient Athenian polis and the post-
1776/1789 societies shared in their theoretical concept of defence much 
more than the army of the French King Louis XVI in 1788 shared with 
the revolutionary French Army of 1792. Decisiveness of battles some-
how correlates with the form of the societies concerned. The theoretical 
shift symbolising the vanishing of the concept of a decisive fight may be 
illustrated by a Cold War scenario. The duel as a symbol was not so much 
between US Presidents and USSR General-Secretaries meeting sporadi-
cally in Geneva or Reykjavik, but in the area of deterrence between the 
two confronting nuclear arsenals. To be fair, one has to mention that the 
arrival of atomic weapons epitomised and somehow perverted the whole 
concept of a decisive battle. As any nuclear warhead was a decisive battle 
in its own capacity, the accumulation of decisive battles of two nuclear 
belligerents may well have annihilated both of them, thereby obliterating 
the difference between the victorious and defeated party.
The time between Breitenfeld and Waterloo has been described as an 
age of decisive battles. But as Russell F. Weigley pointed out in his study 
The Age of Battles – The Quest for Decisive Warfare from Breitenfeld to 
Waterloo 1631 to 1815: “If in a successful battle the enemy army could be 
substantially destroyed – an outcome occasionally taking place – then the 
whole course of the war might be resolved in a single day [...]. Yet the age 
of battles nevertheless proved to be an age of prolonged, indecisive wars.”35
Despite Weigley’s empirical objection, the concept of a decisive battle 
still influenced the military thinking at the beginning of the 20th century. 
The most important example for this was the German military com-
mander and thinker Alfred von Schlieffen, who died before the outbreak 
of the First World War, but was essential for forming the German strategy 
used during the initial phase of this war. Schlieffen was obsessed with the 
35 R. F. Weigley, The Age of Battles. The quest for decisive warfare from Breitenfeld to Waterloo 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1991), xiii.
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battle of Cannae and studied it with his subordinates again and again. As 
the Israeli military historian Jehuda Wallach pointed out in his ground 
breaking study about the dogma of the battle of annihilation, this Can-
nae obsession by Schlieffen led directly to the barbaric slaughterhouse of 
Verdun and by that, in a reversion of intentions, to the German defeat – 
instead of the intended decisive bleeding of the French.36 Therefore the 
trench warfare of the First World War reduced the belief in decisive bat-
tles, but the re-emergence of speed due to mechanisation in the Second 
World War produced some new evidence for the thesis of decisive battles. 
The guerrilla warfare of the de-colonisation period and Vietnam again 
shattered the belief in such singular events. But there is a theoretical con-
cept of decisive battle outside the actual warfare on the battlefields, as 
demonstrated by the following table.
Table 4:
Decisive Battle – 1st level:
Deterministic concept of history Open concept of history
•	 Ultimate/Final	battle/victory	
•	 Ordeal	(decision	by	God)
•	 Turn	of	the	tide,	turning	point,	decisive	campaign
•	 Pyrrhic	victory
•	 War	to	end	all	wars	(militaristic	version)	
/ Eternal peace (pacifistic version)
•	 There	is	probably	no	such	thing	as	a	war	 
to end all wars or an eternal peace
Decisive Battle – 2nd level:
Totalitarian version Democratic version
•	 “Vernichtungsschlacht”	/	“Mother	of	all	
Battles”	/	“Wunderwaffen”	/	“Endsieg”	/	
“Endlösung”	(Holocaust)
•	 Spread	of	freedom
•	 Eternal	peace	in	the	version	of	Mao •	 Eternal	peace	in	the	version	of	Kant
The theoretical concept developed here has two layers or levels. On the 
first level there is a deterministic versus an open perception of history, 
boiled down and thereby extremely simplified to some striking philo-
sophical mindsets like the “end of history” by Francis Fukuyama on the 
one hand and the “openness of the future” by Karl R. Popper on the other 
hand. The deterministic concept would come with notions such as “ulti-
mate battle/victory” or “final battle/victory.” In a pre-modern mindset 
36 Wallach, Das Dogma.
79Learning from Decisive Battles Prerequisites to Define and Identify Them
the decision by God via an ordeal would fit within this framework. The 
open concept would prefer expressions like “turn of the tide,” “turning 
point” or a “decisive campaign” (instead of a battle) and would embrace 
the possibility that there might be Pyrrhic victories. A deterministic con-
cept would believe in a “war to end all wars” in the militaristic version or 
in an eternal peace in the pacifistic version. An open concept of history 
would be inclined to the assumption that there is no such thing as a war 
to end all wars or an eternal peace. The deterministic version seems more 
inclined to the concept of decisive battles, as the open perception may be 
more linked to an ongoing-process-concept of history.
The second level needs the differentiation of the first level as a back-
ground, but is not directly interlinked with the approaches of the first 
level. In fact, it seems that both the totalitarian version and the demo-
cratic version are more inclined to a deterministic vision. Totalitarian 
regimes have widely used expressions like “Vernichtungsschlacht” [battle 
of annihilation], “Mother of all Battles,” “Wunderwaffen” [miracle weap-
ons] and “Endsieg” [German expression used by the Nazi propaganda for 
final victory]. One could even argue that the “Endlösung,” i.e. the Holo-
caust, fell into this category, whereby the former battle character changed 
to a carefully planned mass murder of innocent civilian population.
The democratic version could simply be described as the spread of 
liberty as expressed for example by Thomas Jefferson: “May it be to the 
world, what I believe it will be, (to some parts sooner, to others later, but 
finally to all,) the signal of arousing men to burst the chains under which 
monkish ignorance and superstition had persuaded them to bind them-
selves, and to assume the blessings and security of self-government.”37 
It has to be mentioned that there are even totalitarian and democratic 
versions of eternal peace. Eternal peace as envisioned by Kant is a well-
known concept,38 but Mao came along with quite another interpretation 
of that notion: “The revolutionary wars which have already begun are 
part of the war for perpetual peace.”39
37 T. Jefferson, Writings (Ed. by M.D. Peterson) (New York: Library of America, 1984), 1517.
38 A. Dietze, Ewiger Friede? Dokumente einer Diskussion um 1800 (Munich: Beck, 1989).
39 Mao Tsetung, Ausgewaehlte Militaerische Schriften (Beijing: Verlag fuer fremdsprachige 
Literatur, 1969), 268–271.
80 Oliver B. Hemmerle
To conclude this chapter some modern developments have to be men-
tioned. Two studies on the Second World War, which were both published 
within ten to fifteen years after its end, made slightly different use of the 
term “decisiveness.” Whereas the German book very much embraced the 
traditional Creasy battle-approach, the British study focussed on deci-
sions as a precondition for battles.40 The focus on decisions may have 
been influenced by the atomic bomb experience at the end of the Second 
World War, when the decision by the commander (plus the preparations 
by technicians) became somehow identical with the battle (even though 
this is not the perspective of the people on the ground).
How the notion of decisiveness changed over time can also be dem-
onstrated by illustrations of military history books. Whereas traditional 
representations would show a plan of a battle or a campaign, this imagi-
nary would be partly replaced at least for the two world wars by graphs 
demonstrating for example the changing transport capability of the Allies 
on the Atlantic Ocean. Not the map showing the actual locality of a Ger-
man U-boat sinking an Allied ship is decisive, but the graph illustrat-
ing the number of register tons sank by the U-boats. The parallel of this 
would be a graph depicting the casualties of a certain decisive battle, but 
one would probably in most cases search in vain for such a graph in any 
book predating the 20th century.
Guerrilla + propaganda + media = morale?
Charles de Gaulle in a writing of 1927/28 summarised the German defeat 
of 1918 with the notion “Defeat, a question of morale.”41 But what might 
be the minimal prerequisites for a decisive battle? Is it the short term 
decisiveness (at once) or the long term implications (dominance over a 
longer period or even a new era)?
40 H.-A. Jacobsen and J. Rohwer (ed.), Entscheidungsschlachten des zweiten Weltkriegs (Frank-
furt: Bernard & Graefe, 1960) and W. B. Smith, General Eisenhowers sechs grosse Entscheidun-
gen. Europa 1944-1945 (Bern: Scherz, 1956): Invasion, Normandie, Ardennen, Rhein, Ruhr-
gebiet, Bedingungslose Kapitulation.
41 C. De Gaulle, Le Fil de l'Epee et Autres Ecrits (Paris: Plon, 1990), 617–645.
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Let us test the common nominators of the Anglo-Saxon and the Ger-
man traditions in the footsteps of Creasy. Gaugamela finished off a Per-
sian dynasty, but the Empire of Alexander did not last for long; the Teuto-
burger Wald somehow marked the limits of Roman expansionism, but the 
Roman Empire did not collapse immediately and in some form or another 
stayed on for several centuries; the collapse of the Spanish Armada made 
an emerging British Empire possible, but Spain stayed on as a big power 
for nearly two centuries; Blenheim/Höchstädt had importance to the bal-
ance of power in Europe in the age of Absolutism, but that era itself was 
just 85 years away from a decisive revolutionary blow; Poltava ended the 
greater Swedish Empire and was essential in creating the new Russian 
Empire; Trafalgar destroyed the French fleet, but coincided with Napo-
leon’s biggest land victory at Austerlitz; Waterloo/Belle-Alliance finished 
the Napoleonic Empire, but did not stop the ideas related to the French 
Revolution; Sedan was essential for creating the German Empire, which 
within two generations was defeated twice in 1918 and 1945.
Even if one might disagree with one or another interpretation, it seems 
obvious that the criteria for calling a battle decisive are as different as the 
political, social, cultural and military contexts of these battles. A collapse 
of an old Empire may as well qualify for a decisive battle as the emergence 
of a new Empire would do, but the decisiveness of the battle may differ 
from a causality between the battle and the actual collapse or creation 
of an Empire to a situation, where the battle was not the real reason but 
that what finally triggered it. Some modern authors of the Anglo-Saxon 
tradition have interpreted Little Big Horn as a decisive battle: decisive in 
the sense that George Armstrong Custer and all his men were annihi-
lated? Certainly. Decisive in the sense that the Indian cause succeeded 
militarily or politically? Certainly not. But nevertheless Little Big Horn 
became a symbol, which the Indians in the Civil Right struggle could 
count on.
There comes a different layer to the notion of a decisive battle: the pro-
pagandistic value. At least one author of the Anglo-Saxon tradition has 
counted Dunkirk as a decisive battle. Why is that? The saving of British 
soldiers by all boats available did not make Dunkirk a decisive battle in 
military terms; at most it made it a humanitarian success for a democracy 
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fighting Nazism. But it certainly was a decisive propagandistic step, as 
Dunkirk was not only perceived by the British public as a defeat followed 
by other defeats still to come, but also as a sign of hope. This may not be 
a rational evaluation of the actual event, but it may well have had practi-
cal implications for the propaganda effort of Churchill. And therefore it 
may well be more decisive in the long run than the German “Blitzkrieg” 
Panzer assault, which smashed France in 1940 and was quite decisive in 
the immediate present of May and June 1940.
The most decisive event of the Vietnam War was for many civilian 
Americans and Europeans not the Tet or any other offensives, but the 
massacre of My Lai. Although it had no military significance at all, it had 
a large impact on how the war turned out, because it influenced morale 
at home. It is trivial to say, but has to be mentioned, that hostage taking 
by ISIS and other terrorist organizations is terrible for the hostages and 
their families and a brutal and barbaric act, but has no military impor-
tance in itself. Only when Aljazeera, CBS, CNN and Fox report about it 
(sometimes showing the film footage provided by the hostage takers), it 
becomes a political and thereby military factor, as it may affect morale 
within the troops (including for this matter “neutral” aid organisations) 
and public opinion back home.
This essay is not the place to elaborate on this interdependency, but 
one has to keep in mind the consequences of the media age as a changed 
environment or context for decisive battles. Guerrilla fighters and terror-
ists can create via the media, and at times only by the media, a coverage 
of certain events, which are then a decisive factor within the conduct of 
war – and therefore decisive battles can be lost in this field. Could these 
current events be listed in the way employed by Creasy? At times. My Lai 
is probably the best example of this, up until now. To complicate things 
further: “At Alamein, Rommel was utterly defeated but not annihilated: 
Alamein was a decisive victory but not a complete one.”42
This interpretation from the memoirs of Field-Marshal Earl Alex-
ander of Tunis reminds us of a basic principle of Clausewitz: “There-
fore the war is an act of violence, which forces our enemy to fulfil our 
42 J. North (ed.), The Alexander Memoirs 1940-1945 (London: Cassell, 1962), 26.
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will.”43 As much as the enemy was forced to fulfil our will, the battle was 
decisive. But what is then the difference between a decisive and a com-
plete victory? “The importance of a victory does not only correlate with 
the increasing amount of the defeated enemy forces, but rises to higher 
degrees.”44 To a certain extent the notion “complete victory” is the most 
decisive short-term outcome of a battle or a campaign. But even a com-
plete victory may not qualify to be a decisive battle. If at Alamein Rommel 
had been not only utterly defeated but also annihilated, Alamein would 
have been a complete victory, but not necessarily a decisive battle, as the 
result would not have changed the position of power of Nazism within 
the Fortress Europe. The Normandy invasion was in that respect much 
more a decisive battle, not only by the historical outcome of this engage-
ment, but because even a failure of the Allies would have had a decisive 
impact on the fate of continental Europe.
Concluding remarks: is there such a thing  
as a “decisive battle” in the War on Terror?
“There was no silver bullet” to prevent 9/11, argued Condoleezza Rice 
during the hearings on how 9/11 could have been prevented. As there 
was apparently no decisive measure to prevent the attacks on 9/11, the 
question would be, if there are at least in theory decisive battles in the 
fight against terrorism. After 9/11 a debate about the “war” character of 
the “War on Terror” started. An argument of – in the terms once used by 
Donald H. Rumsfeld – “Old Europe” strategists would be that the concept 
of “War on Terror” is an oxymoron, because the battlefields of terrorism 
and of armies are so different. Both sides have arguments for their case: 
decisive battles for some Afghan and Iraqi cities/fortresses on the one 
hand, ongoing guerrilla activities on the other hand. When the US-led 
43 C. v. Clausewitz, Vom Kriege. Hinterlassenes Werk. Ungekuerzter Text (Munich: Ullstein, 
1980), 17 [“Der Krieg ist also ein Akt der Gewalt, um den Gegner zur Erfuellung unseres Wil-
len zu zwingen”].
44 Clausewitz, Vom Kriege, 235 [“Die Groesse eines Sieges [steigt] nicht bloss in dem Masse, 
wie die besiegten Streitkraefte an Umfang zunehmen, sondern in hoeheren Graden”].
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war against the Taliban in Afghanistan started, the media reported about 
the US bombing of the bin-Laden mountain retreat of Tora Bora. The 
name “Tora Bora” alone, made in Western or at least in civilian Western 
minds, more allusions to an enemy in a James Bond film than to military 
fighting by the standards of the 21st century.
Then a massacre by Northern alliance troops of revolting Talibans at 
the Qala-i-Janghi prison at the fortress of Mazar-i-Sharif was reported. 
Much less was talked at the time about the capturing of the fortress of 
Mazar-i-Sharif in the first place and about the effects of the US bombing 
campaign on the ground (for example in Tora Bora). The media seemed 
puzzled, when out of the blue the Northern Alliance troops entered Kabul. 
During the progress of the campaign at least ordinary people (like histo-
rians), people without any access to the information of the military high 
command, could not feel the decisive points of the campaign. Several years 
and many CNN, Fox and BBC in-depth-reports and analysis have passed 
since then, one still could not feel the decisive points of this campaign. 
Were there yet a Stalingrad and a D-Day in the fight against terrorism?
When Kabul fell with surprisingly little resistance, a major campaign 
was certainly over, but there are still problems to grasp the content of 
that campaign. The argument would be that the complexity of the war on 
terrorism makes it even more difficult to grasp the decisive battle within 
this war – if there is one. The same goes with Iraq. The entry of US forces 
into Baghdad on 9 April 2003, – after hours and hours, days and days 
of embedded CNN camera views from the desert – clearly symbolised 
that the war against any organised Iraqi military under Saddam Hussein’s 
command was coming to an end. We know by now and probably guessed 
it then, that the fight with terrorist gangs was yet to come. But are there 
identifiable turning points? Was another purging of terrorist hideouts in 
Fallujah a turning point? And now with IS/ISIS/ISIL/DAESH? How many 
recaptures like Palmyra, how many drone strikes, and how many arrests 
in Brussels and Paris does it take to call it “decisive”?
At least in theory there is still the possibility of a decisive battle. But 
this decisive battle is what it probably always was: a concept of hindsight, a 
concept of historians in the tradition of Creasy. After the first Napoleonic 
abdication in 1814 most people would have seen the Russian Campaign 
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of 1812 and the battle of Leipzig in 1813 as the decisive battles of the war 
against Napoleon. When he returned to France from the tiny island of 
Elba a year later in 1815, it turned out that it would need another decisive 
battle – the battle of Waterloo – to close this chapter of history. With the 
experience of Napoleon’s return, Waterloo could probably only by hind-
sight after 5 May 1821 (death of Napoleon at St. Helena), be labelled as 
the most decisive battle in the wars of the French Revolution and of the 
Napoleonic period. But most of the ideas represented by the French Rev-
olution and Napoleon were not beaten, they re-emerged during the revo-
lutions of the 1830s and in 1848, today they form in a revised form the 
essential core of nearly all European democracies. So probably Valmy in 
1792 as the first victory of the troops of the French Revolution was more 
important than the decisive blow against Napoleonic rule at Waterloo in 
1815, because the values of 1789 (Liberty, Equality, Fraternity) were much 
more decisive than the program set out by the self-proclaimed “Holy Alli-
ance” after the defeat of Napoleon?
“From here and today starts a new era in world history, and you can 
say, that you were present.” These were the words Johann Wolfgang von 
Goethe addressed to his fellow German soldiers, after they had expe-
rienced the French victory at Valmy.45 One has to concede that Goethe 
caught the decisiveness of the battle on the spot, but how many victories 
have been declared to be decisive or even final and turned out to be Pyr-
rhic? Following the line of argument that decisive battles are a concept 
of hindsight and therefore a concept of historians, it is much too early 
to identify any decisive battles in the War on Terror. When Sir Edward 
Creasy wrote his book in 1851, the last decisive battle described by him 
was Waterloo. Waterloo, whether you accept it as a decisive battle or not, 
had been history then for thirty six years.
45 J. W. v. Goethe, Sämtliche Werke (Ed. by K. Goedeke). Volume 24: Kampagne in Frankreich 
– Die Belagerung von Mainz (Stuttgart: Cotta, [s.a.], 51). [“Von hier und heute geht eine neue 
Epoche der Weltgeschichte aus, und ihr könnt sagen, ihr seid dabei gewesen”].
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